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Abstract: We articulate a distinction between ontology, understood 
as involving existence questions, and metaphysics, understood as 
either providing for metaphysical profiles of entities or else as 
dealing with fundamentality and/or grounding and dependence 
questions. The distinction, we argue, allows a better understanding 
of the roles of metaontology and metametaphysics when it comes 
to discussing the relations between ontology and science on the 
one hand, and metaphysics and science on the other. We argue that 
while ontology, as understood in this paper, may have reasonable 
perspectives for naturalization, given its relation to science, the 
same cannot be said for metaphysics, given that it is typically 
understood as an additional theoretical layer over science, not 
participating in the scientific investigation. That may result either 
in skepticism over metaphysics, or else on accepting that 
metaphysics is an autonomous branch of investigation, depending 





Following the lead of Quine, ontology is traditionally said 
to deal with the question of what exists, while metaphysics, 
perhaps following Aristotle, works on a more shady area, 
dealing with some disparate issues such as being qua being, 
causality, theology, and in more recent times, the nature of 
modality, personal identity, free will, the nature of mind, 
among other things. Drawing such a division in the subject 
matter seems to indicate that they are indeed distinct areas 
of research. But are they? The question is important, because 
the methods employed to deal with problems in one area 
(questions of existence) may not fit profitably into the proper 
inquiry in the other area (more general metaphysical 
questions); the goals of one area may not be the goals of the 
other, and vice versa. In other words: debates in 
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metaontology and metametaphysics also depend on how one 
sees the goals in each of the areas and also their relationship. 
In particular, given that metaontology and metametaphysics 
may be seen as specially concerned with epistemological issues 
related to ontology and metaphysics, respectively, this 
question of the appropriate delimitation of each area may be 
of special interest for those concerned with the epistemology 
for each of them.  
To exemplify the importance of having some distinction 
between those fields, consider debates on whether some 
disputes in metaphysics/ontology are merely verbal, or 
perhaps the discussion concerning the relation between 
metaphysics/ontology and science, which is the one we shall 
be more concerned with. Only once ontology and 
metaphysics are properly understood, those issues, which 
involve higher-order claims, will be able to be properly 
addressed. Ontology, on the characterization we are 
adopting here, deals directly with existence questions and 
(typically with) the role of quantifiers, while metaontology 
discusses mostly whether existential quantifiers are up to the 
task of expressing existence and how to make objective 
existential claims; metaphysics, on the other hand, does not 
completely surrender to discussions on quantifiers and 
existence. In fact, there are many problems in metaphysics 
that simply cannot be dealt with by solely focusing on 
existence and quantifiers; the corresponding 
metametaphysical investigation will not be adequate if it is 
concerned only with the role of quantifiers in such 
investigations. So, identifying the two areas may lead to 
confusion also on the second-order investigation of 
methodology and goals of each area.    
However, despite seeming a pretty natural and fruitful 
distinction, the separation between ontology and 
metaphysics is not always as clear as it should be, and this 
happens mostly where the distinction is of utmost 
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importance: in discussions concerning the methodology of 
these areas. Perhaps it is not completely off the mark to say 
that part of the current identification of ontology and 
metaphysics lies in the offspring of the Carnap-Quine debate 
on ontology. While Carnap and Quine were discussing 
ontology in the sense delineated above, and not metaphysics 
in a broader sense, descendants of Quine seem to be thinking 
of him as laying the grounds for the work in metaphysics in 
a much broader sense. Also, while Carnap was thinking 
about ontology when he proposed his approach to existence 
questions in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (ESO), 
his descendants (the neo-Carnapians) apply this same 
approach overall, to many issues that do not seem to concern 
only problems of existence. Proposals concerned with 
ontology were extrapolated to metaphysics, with the result 
that confusions in the respective discussions on the 
methodology and epistemology of ontology and metaphysics 
have increased.  
In this paper, we shall argue that keeping both areas 
separated brings benefits for current debates, in particular 
for the debate on the relation between ontology and science 
and the one hand, and metaphysics and science on the other. 
We are certainly aware that focusing on what seems to be 
terminological issues may lead to pseudo-problems, but we 
believe that the distinction we shall advocate here is full of 
consequences for the debate on the relation between 
ontology and metaphysics with science, a debate that 
occupies the center of the stage nowadays. That is, the 
distinction being advanced here, although quite general, 
bears important fruits for the relation of ontology and 
metaphysics with science, and this is the major concern that lies 
in the background of our discussion. That being said, in 
sections 2 and 3, we begin by distinguishing the areas in 
clearer terms, illustrating how ontology may be understood 
as the task of providing for a catalog of reality, and how 
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metaphysics builds from there. In section 3, in particular, we 
suggest how the relation between ontology and metaphysics 
may be understood, once the distinction is drawn. That 
relation will allow one to keep both investigations separated, 
and distinct verdicts on the fruitfulness of establishing 
relations between ontology and science on the one hand, and 
metaphysics and science on the other, will emerge. In section 
4, we argue that on a reasonable interpretation, the Carnap-
Quine debate on ontology indicates that there is a pragmatic 
approach to ontology that benefits, even if little, from the 
epistemic authority of science. The same cannot be clearly 
said of metaphysics. This indicates that a kind of naturalism 
may be, at least in principle, vindicated for ontological issues, 
but not so clearly for metaphysical issues. As a result, the 
distinction between ontology and metaphysics contributes to 
the epistemology of both areas, even if pointing negatively 
to the possible benefits that metaphysics may somehow 
derive from science. We conclude in section 5. 
 
 
2. Ontology and metaontology 
 
Let us begin by putting in clear terms what is to be 
understood as the proper subject of ontology. While this 
cannot be done in a crystal-clear fashion for most academic 
disciplines (not even for mathematics and physics), some 
clarifying hints may be advanced (as it is typically done for 
mathematics and physics). That will also work for ontology, 
and for our purposes it will be enough to make it clear that, 
for good reasons, it should be understood as a field of 
research that is distinct from metaphysics. The idea here is 
not new, although the approach advanced may present some 
connections that will allow us also to illuminate second-order 
discussions. Basically, we conceive ontology as in the 
Quinean (and Carnapian) tradition, dealing with questions of 
 Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Raoni W. Arroyo 6 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
existence (e.g., are there numbers? are there material bodies? 
and so on). The following is a nice summary of the proposed 
distinction, by Hofweber (the same distinction, but with 
different terminology, was already present in Arenhart 2012):  
 
In metaphysics we want to find out what reality 
is like in a general way. One part of this will be 
to find out what the things or the stuff are that 
are part of reality. Another part of metaphysics 
will be to find out what these things, or this 
stuff, are like in general ways. Ontology, on this 
quite standard approach to metaphysics, is the 
first part of this project, i.e. it is the part of 
metaphysics that tries to find out what things 
make up reality. Other parts of metaphysics 
build on ontology and go beyond it, but 
ontology is central to it, […]. Ontology is 
generally carried out by asking questions about 
what there is or what exists. (Hofweber 2016, 
p.13) 
 
On this conception, ontology is a proper part of 
metaphysics, and it is concerned with the furniture of the 
world. One should attempt to make a list of the existing 
entities, in general terms. Although the ontological list is an 
important part of ontology, it does not fully exhaust what 
ontology is. Another part of ontology would consist in the 
classification of the entities obtained from the list into kinds, 
or types: are they particular objects, processes, events, 
properties, relations, or something else? Note that this does 
not involve yet doing metaphysics properly. Metaphysics will 
build on that list, trying to describe more generally the nature 
of those items and their metaphysical relations (dependence 
relations, questions of priority, and so on; we shall return to 
this in the next section). There is a further virtue of this 
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approach in confining ontology to this specific task: it allows 
one to concentrate only on ontology, if that is desired, 
without entering the deeper (and muddier?) waters of 
metaphysics. Obviously, a reason must be given for doing 
that (and we shall try to provide some reasons why someone 
might do that in section 4), but restricting the scope of 
investigation like that is not unreasonable in principle. 
Examples of ontological investigation in this specific 
sense are not difficult to find. One could ask whether there 
are numbers, for instance, or whether there are properties. 
As it is known, Bertrand Russell, in his brand of logicism (see 
Russell 1993), for instance, did not recognize classes as being 
part of the furniture of the world, but accepted properties 
and relations. Out of properties and relations, classes would 
be defined, and from them, natural numbers and, in fact, the 
rest of mathematics known at the time, was supposed to be 
obtained (there are difficulties, of course, with the axiom of 
infinity and axiom of reducibility, but let us not bother with 
that). Quine, on the other hand, adopting a version of 
physicalism with classes, had famously populated the world 
with bodies and classes; from classes the mathematicalia 
needed for science is introduced. Further examples will be 
discussed later. 
When we so delimit the scope of ontology, so that it is 
understood as dealing specifically with what exists, 
metaontology also acquires a more specific aspect. The 
central issue is how to properly understand existence claims 
and their objectivity. On the nature of existence claims, to 
begin with that, one may dispute whether existence is 
properly captured by the existential quantifier, or perhaps 
whether an existence predicate is preferable, and also 
whether there is only one meaning for the existential 
quantifier or, yet, whether one may use distinct languages, 
each endowing the existential quantifier with a specific 
meaning (for doubts about the role of the existential 
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quantifier as capturing what is real, see Azzouni 1998; for 
discussion on quantifier variance, see Hirsh 2009). On what 
concerns the objectivity of first-order ontological claims, the 
problem then becomes, as Chalmers (2009, p.77) puts it, to 
determine whether existence claims can be objectively true, 
or not. This leads to disputes between realists and anti-
realists about ontology. As we shall see, metaontology must 
have this specific aspect, because then it may be more clearly 
distinguished from issues discussed in metametaphysics.  
 
 
3. Metaphysics and metametaphysics 
 
Once ontology is confined to the specific task of 
providing the entities that populate the world and their 
respective types, what kind of role is left for metaphysics? As 
we have mentioned, following the distinction highlighted by 
Hofweber, metaphysics, in large measure, starts precisely 
where ontology stops, and develops from there. The idea is 
that part of the task of metaphysics consists of providing a 
description of the nature of the entities that we take as 
existing (and, in fact, metaphysics does even more, but some 
of the tasks attributed to metaphysics will not be dealt with 
here). But how is this supposed to work? 
There are at least two possible approaches allowing us to 
plug a metaphysical layer over an ontology. We discuss them 
briefly here: 1) metaphysics provides a “metaphysical 
profile” or “metaphysical dressing” of the existing entities, 
or 2) metaphysics deals with questions of fundamentality, 
grounding, and dependence relations. Those two approaches 
are not necessarily excluding each other, but we shall merely 
mention one possible relationship between them here, 
without committing ourselves to a deeper discussion of the 
issue here (this is left for further work).  
Let us begin with the claim that metaphysics is 
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responsible for attributing a metaphysical profile. The idea is 
quite simple: once one admits that some kind X of entities 
exists, one may wish to go ahead and still provide for a 
“metaphysical dress” or a “metaphysical profile” for these 
entities (the idea is developed for a specific case in quantum 
mechanics in French 2013). That means that it is not enough 
to determine what there is and claim that one is committed 
to such entities; one must also be able to spell in detail what 
those entities are in metaphysical terms. Steven French 
(2014, p.48) puts it in terms of what he calls “Chakravartty’s 
Challenge”. Obviously, the terms of the challenge were 
advanced by Chakravartty himself:  
 
One cannot fully appreciate what it might mean 
to be a realist until one has a clear picture of 
what one is being invited to be a realist about. 
(Chakravartty 2007, p.26) 
 
In other words: when existence questions are connected with 
identifying the posits of our best scientific theories, so that 
one is being invited to believe in the existence of a certain 
kind of entity that a specific theory requires, then, according 
to this approach, one cannot simply say “I believe in the 
existence of such and such entities”, without having a clear 
picture of what such entities are; having an ontology is not 
enough (according to French’s version of Chakravartty’s 
Challenge), one must “dress” such entities in clear 
metaphysical clothes. Notice: the point is that, on what 
concerns scientific realism, that deals precisely with the belief 
in the existence of the posits of our best scientific theories, 
the claim is that one cannot stop only at the ontological level, 
describing what the posits accepted are; one must provide 
for a metaphysical description of those posits to engender 
legitimate commitment (or, at least, that is how the 
description of the Challenge goes, and we shall not bring it 
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into question here). It is instructive to check how French 
spells the details of how such an investigation might then 
proceed in a specific example. That is done just after French 
advances the above quote by Chakravartty: 
 
But how do we obtain this clear picture? A 
simple answer would be, through physics 
which gives us a certain picture of the world as 
including particles, for example. But is this 
clear enough? Consider the further, but 
apparently obvious, question, are this particles 
individual objects, like chairs, tables, or people 
are? In answering this question, we need to 
supply, I maintain, or at least allude to, an 
appropriate metaphysics of individuality, and 
this exemplifies the general claim that in order 
to obtain Chakravartty’s clear picture and 
hence obtain an appropriate realist 
understanding we need to provide an 
appropriate metaphysics. Those who reject any 
such need are either closet empiricists or 
‘ersatz’ realists. (French 2014, p.48)  
 
So, the idea is this: once physics (in this example) provides 
for particles (the ontology), one may ask a further question 
about the metaphysical nature of such particles. Provided 
that one takes the route of classifying the particles as 
particular objects, then, one of such additional metaphysical 
questions concerns the individuality of such particles, a 
question whose answer depends on an appropriate metaphysics 
of individuality; thence the need for a further layer of 
metaphysics over ontology (or so it is said, and again, we are 
here merely using the discussion of Chakravartty’s Challenge 
as an example of how the connection between metaphysics 
and ontology may go, not discussing its merits).  
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As we are discussing it, then, the idea that metaphysics 
concerns a profile for scientific ontology is very much on a 
par with issues on characterizations of scientific realism. The 
latter traditionally contains an existential aspect, e.g., the 
“belief in the ontology of scientific theories” (Chakravartty 
2017). In this sense, one may be tempted to understand 
Chakravartty’s Challenge as involving an exclusively 
existential demand: one can only be a realist about some 
entity provided that one assumes such entity exists. 
However, the existential aspect is not yet the clear picture 
demanded by French’s version of “Chakravartty’s 
Challenge”, and this is made clear on several occasions: for 
instance, it would not count as legitimate realism a view 
“accepting that there are electrons, for example, but refusing 
to go any further and state what sorts of things electrons are” 
(French 2018a, p.395); and that is also confirmed by the 
claim that “when the object-oriented realist is unable to tell 
us whether electrons, qua objects, are individuals or not, it 
risks vacuity” (French 2015, p.194). Only those going 
beyond the ontological aspect of the entities that one is a 
realist about (but still assuming the existence of these very 
entities) and providing a metaphysical profile for such 
entities are ‘legitimate’ (i.e. non-ersatz) scientific realists. In 
this sense, ontology has chronological and methodological 
priority for debates concerning metaphysics and science in 
the context of scientific realism: in order for someone to 
assign a metaphysical profile to the entities of the ontology 
of a scientific theory, ontology needs to be on the table 
beforehand, even if only tentatively. This is not always the 
case in other debates on metaontology and metametaphysics 
(as we will see later in this paper), but it certainly is the case 
in this specific type of debate that we are interested in in this 
article — which is far from exhausting or reducing the 
extremely rich debate in these areas. It may also be argued 
that the metaphysical profile should be settled before one 
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can even admit the entities in one’s ontology. This might be 
the case for hardcore metaphysicians, who judge science 
from the standpoint of a first philosophy; but this is hardly 
the case in the metaphysics of science — where science must 
play at least a role in the methodological play.  
Let us check with some more details how the relation of 
metaphysics and ontology, under this picture, is supposed to 
work. French, in the quote presented above, where he 
develops the formulation of Chakravartty’s challenge, 
discusses the particular case of individuality. Recall: given an 
ontology of objects (particles), there is then a further issue (a 
metaphysical question) as to the metaphysical account of 
their individuality. In Lowe’s (2003 p.75)  terms, the 
individuality question concerns what is it that makes an 
individual precisely that individual, and not any other 
individual, that is, the individuality of an item is granted by 
“whatever it is that makes it the single object that it is — 
whatever it is that makes it one object, distinct from others, 
and the very object that it is as opposed to any other thing”. 
Several approaches to individuality are available in the 
metaphysical literature; this is not the place to list and discuss 
them in details, but for the sake of illustration, let us just 
mention three of them and their main differences (again, see 
Lowe 2003 for a survey on individuality).  
To begin with, some approaches to individuality attempt 
to grant individuality by means of a qualitative property that 
singles each item over every other, in such a way that 
numerically distinct items always correspond to qualitatively 
distinct items. A clear advantage of this approach is that 
whatever it is that confers the metaphysical feature of 
individuality to an item may also be what allows us to 
distinguish it from other items (an epistemic feature); the 
disadvantage of this approach is that qualitatively 
indistinguishable items are not allowed to be individuals. In 
order to account for the possibility of cases involving 
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qualitative indiscernibility, an alternative approach to 
individuality proposes that individuality is conferred by an 
item of a non-qualitative nature, such as a Lockean substratum, 
or a haecceity. While a substratum is a self-individuated 
particular item that accounts for an entity’s individuality by 
the simple fact of its presence in the item (it is an ‘ingredient’ 
of the individual), a haecceity is typically conceived as a non-
qualitative property of being identical to a specific individual 
(for instance, Plato’s haecceity would be the property ‘to be 
identical with Plato’), so that it is instantiated only by one 
item. The main disadvantage of these approaches, of course, 
is that they leave the epistemology associated with the 
scientific posits (the particles, in French’s example) miles 
away from the accompanying metaphysics; the item doing 
the metaphysical job (be it a substratum or a haecceity) is 
simply epistemically inaccessible. Another family of 
approaches to individuality attempt to attribute individuality 
by spatio-temporal trajectory; according to this approach, 
that which confers individuality to something is the fact that 
it has a trajectory exclusive for it (for a discussion on how 
these approaches fare in the case of quantum particles, see 
French and Krause 2006; for further details on the 
metaphysics of individuality, see Lowe 2003).  
Without going into the details of the discussion, the 
general idea may be put as follows: given the entities 
provided by ontology, metaphysics adds a further layer of 
theoretical content by providing for further characterization 
on many distinct fronts. This is also called the toolbox of 
metaphysics approach, or the Viking approach to the metaphysics 
of science; given the ontology of a specific theory, the 
metaphysician of science goes to the metaphysics toolbox to 
find concepts that may be appropriated to dress the posits of 
science and provide for a clear version of realism 
(addressing, thus, Chakravartty’s Challenge; see French 
2018b). One may do the same kind of discussion for many 
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items. Consider spacetime. From the ontology of General 
Relativity, let us say, one accepts that there is something 
called spacetime. As for the metaphysical questions, there is 
the dispute on the nature of spacetime and how spacetime 
relates with other entities, giving rise to such issues as the 
debate between tri-dimensionalism and four-
dimensionalism, along with disputes involving endurantism 
and perdurantism. Note that these metaphysical views are all 
attempts to go into detail on the posit of ontology 
(spacetime).  
For another case, consider properties. Once properties 
are adopted in the furniture of the world, there is the further 
issue of how to understand metaphysically the nature of 
properties. Some metaphysicians may say they are universals, 
others may think they are tropes. Those are different 
characterizations of properties, and they deal with issues 
distinct from the existence of properties.  
 This brings us to the second way metaphysics may build 
on ontology: discussions of grounding,  priority, 
fundamentality and dependence. Although leading to 
different discussions, all these terms refer to the same kind 
of basic intuition: the idea whether there is a sort of 
explanation that has a distinctively metaphysical nature, and 
as such, is investigated by metaphysics. The grounding 
relation is thought of as a sui generis metaphysical explanatory 
relation, and may be employed either as building the less 
fundamental blocks of reality from the most fundamental 
ones (and there are disputes on which are the fundamental 
ones), or else, it may be used as a metaphysical tool to discuss 
such a grounding relation connecting non-fundamental 
relata, basically to explain the dependence relations between 
items that, again, need not be fundamental. While it is not 
our business to enter into a detailed discussion of what it 
means to provide for a metaphysical explanation, the idea is 
clearly a metaphysical thesis that could be seen as building 
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on an ontology given beforehand. This would happen in 
cases where the grounding entities are of a given type, and 
may be seen as grounding entities of another type (and, again, 
the types of entities are provided by the ontology). For an 
instance that shall come to our attention very soon, consider 
the claim that properties may be considered as grounding the 
particulars, in a bundle theory, or whether the particulars are 
required to be there beforehand, and cannot be completely 
explained in terms of properties, or, perhaps, whether 
particulars could be explained, completely, in terms of 
relations (see, for instance, the discussion in French 2010, 
although French does not use the ‘grounding’ vocabulary, 
but rather ‘dependence’).  
Given that this may also serve to distinguish metaphysics 
from ontology, it is interesting to check how Benovsky 
(2016) puts the point. According to him, the goal of 
metaphysics is to provide metaphysical explanations, so the 
goal of the metaphysician would be to find the primitive 
notions accounting for the behavior or function to be 
explained. The fundamental notions ground the non-
fundamental ones. This, of course, goes a long way from 
finding the catalog of reality. According to Benovsky (2016, 
p.69),  
 
The very point of building a metaphysical 
theory is to provide an explanation for some 
phenomena that we want to better understand 
(particularity of particulars, sharing the same 
property, persistence through time, …) […] the 
picture one gets of what metaphysics does and 
what it should do is thus not just to tell us what 
there is but, more importantly, […] to discover 
what are the most fundamental notions, which 
are primitive and which are not. The idea here 
is that metaphysics does not and should not 
 Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Raoni W. Arroyo 16 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
give us a list that is a sort of inventory of what 
there is, but rather a top-down structure of 
relations of ‘grounding’ or ‘explanation’ 
between types of entities or between concepts, 
saying which are primitive, which are not, and 
which are more fundamental than others.  
 
While Benovsky does not use these claims to endorse the 
separation of labor between ontology and metaphysics 
(preferring to somehow defend that the real issue concerns 
fundamentality, against existence questions), we believe that 
this characterization fits pretty well with the distinction we 
have provided here, i.e. it does not exclude the possibility of 
complementary work between metaphysics, so conceived, 
and a distinct field of ontology whose concern is with 
existence questions.  
To get a clearer idea of how this top-down structure may 
be based on ontology, consider the following example of a 
discussion by Koslicki (2016). According to Koslicki, one 
may agree on the question of whether there are tropes, but 
disagree on issues of fundamentality. One may assume (1) a 
pure trope theory according to which individuals are bundles 
of tropes, so that tropes are individuated primitively, or else 
(2) one may assume an impure trope theory according to 
which tropes and objects exist primitively, but in which 
tropes are individuated by the objects in which they occur 
(e.g. the redness of this ball, in opposition to the redness of 
that table). The main difference, then, does not concern 
whether tropes exist, but whether they have their 
individualities depending on the individuality of the objects 
they occur in. In the first theory, tropes are more 
fundamental than objects (they constitute the objects), so 
that objects cannot ground the tropes’ individuality. In 
theory (2), tropes and objects are fundamental, but the 
individuality of the tropes is grounded in the individuality of 
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the objects. Curiously, Koslicki uses the case to deny that 
ontology and metaphysics are the same thing, and to 
challenge the idea that metaphysics should deal with 
existence questions. That is, again, perfectly fine, and our 
distinction makes the case clearer. Assuming that there are 
important questions of fundamentality does not prevent one 
from also adopting a separation of work and recognizing that 
there is a field that deals specifically with existence questions. 
In fact, the distinction defended here dissolves disputes such 
as the one Koslicki and Benovsky are willing to substantiate, 
between questions of grounding and existence questions. 
Koslicki (2016, p.233) concludes the following from this 
dispute:  
 
Since the pure and the impure trope theorist, as 
we noted above, agree on the relevant 
existential questions, “Are there tropes?” and 
“Are there concrete particular objects?”, their 
dispute cannot be characterized as a purely 
existential disagreement which would be 
amenable to a Carnapian or Quinean approach 
to ontology. 
 
She then goes on to argue that metaphysics should not focus 
on existential questions. However, there needs not to be a dispute 
between metaphysics and ontology if each is given its due, as the 
distinction presently suggested does. Koslicki is right in 
claiming that this kind of dispute is out of the reach of the 
concerns of the Quinean and Carnapian approach to 
ontology, but mainly because Quine and Carnap were 
concerned with another family of problems, not because 
they thought existential problems should be the sole focus 
of metaphysics. Both approaches complement each other, 
and Koslicki is not right in trying to downplay the role of 
ontology in benefit of fundamentality questions. There is no 
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issue of which should be the correct goal of 
metaphysics/ontology. Distinguishing both allows for a 
better characterization of each one’s aims and methods.  
Notice how this could map on the problem raised by 
French, concerning the individuality of particles: in the pure 
tropes approach, a particle is understood as a collection of 
tropes, and its objectuality is reduced to tropes only. Then, 
the ontology has only properties and relations, 
metaphysically dressed as tropes. On the impure picture, the 
ontology has objects, and properties and relations; the 
properties and relations are dressed as tropes, and one still 
has to provide an account for the individuality of the objects 
(through a substratum, haecceity, or even primitive 
individuality). But, again, the point is that both kinds of 
questions are not excluding each other, and one may turn to 
metaphysics to develop the discussion on the dependence 
relations. Notice that while the ‘metaphysical dressing’ 
perspective requires that we focus on providing for 
metaphysical descriptions of the posits, the grounding 
approach requires a focus on the relations between different 
metaphysical concepts. A clear relation between these, 
certainly, is possible, but we shall not discuss it here. 
In fact, one of the defenders of the fundamentality of 
tropes (with no objects being fundamental), Campbell, as 
quoted by Koslicki, seems to be laboring on the very 
distinction advanced here. Campbell (1990) assumes that 
spacetime is a basic single trope, and that the other basic 
tropes are fields provided by physics; that is, once we have a 
physics-based ontology, we may provide for a metaphysical 
profile for them in terms of tropes:  
 
All basic tropes are space-filling fields, each 
one of them distributes some quantity, in 
perhaps varying intensities, across all of space-
time. What are the plausible candidates for 
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such cosmos-filling basic tropes? The ones that 
spring to mind first are those we already think 
of as having field characteristics, the 
fundamental forces recognized in 
contemporary physics. So we postulate 
superimposed fields for gravitation, 
electromagnetism, the weak and the strong 
nuclear forces. (Campbell 1990, p.146) 
 
Again, ontology (as based on our best physics) populates the 
world with physical fields, while metaphysics deals with the 
profile of such fields and with priority questions (e.g. ‘are 
there also fundamental objects?’, ‘can objects be grounded 
on tropes?’ and so on). The picture described by Campbell 
makes better sense in the kind of distinction being advanced 
here, and seems to require a naturalistic approach to 
ontology (or at least a physics-based ontology), as we shall 
discuss soon. This also illustrates the kind of relationship 
that may obtain between both approaches to metaphysics 
under discussion here: a profile (in the sense of a required 
metaphysical profile to answer Chakravartty’s Challenge) 
may be given in terms of the fundamental concepts, or in 
terms of concepts that are grounded in such fundamental 
concepts. Both approaches seem to be complementary in 
many interesting cases.   
Before we move on, it is important to emphasize that the 
discussion of grounding relations is not necessarily 
connected to the discussion of fundamentality. Although 
one of the most basic concerns of grounding is clearly tied 
to the idea of building the world from the basics, in a unified 
metaphysical picture, so that the fundamental entities are the 
grounds for all the rest, one may clearly find other uses for 
grounding. A prominent case concerns employing the 
grounding relation for items that are not fundamental, in 
which case it may be thought of as describing a dependence 
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relation (see Barnes 2012). What is important for us is that 
even in this case, one could see the problem of relating 
ontological types by a kind of metaphysical connection, 
without connecting the relata that account for the basis as 
fundamental in any sense. This is quite convenient for those 
willing to apply the tools of dependence relations to the 
entities posited by theories that are not considered basic 
(mostly, theories that are not from fundamental physics). 
Once the distinction between metaphysics and ontology 
is properly made, a further question remains to be addressed, 
which is the kind of problem that metametaphysics would 
have to deal with in this kind of approach. Metametaphysics 
deals with the question of whether there are objective claims 
of metaphysics (whether claims of metaphysical profiles are 
truth-apt) and how to properly investigate such issues. This 
is not a question about quantifiers and appropriate 
representation of existence, or how to read ontological 
commitments from specific theories or pieces of discourse. 
Rather, they concern the role of the primitive or fundamental 
terms in a metaphysical picture and the proper 
understanding of grounding (for a nice discussion on this 
issue, see Benovsky 2016).  
Now, the friends of grounding have already made it very 
clear that these questions are not the same questions of 
ontology, and so the problems in metametaphysics will have 
to be addressed differently from questions of metaontology. 
The idea that we may discuss the objectivity of quantification 
over universals or tropes makes little sense here. Rather, the 
discussion concerns whether tropes or universals are 
appropriate to ground whatever needs to be grounded, and 
how that is to be done. Notice that from this perspective the 
claim by Koslicki, quoted before, that on the debate between 
pure and impure trope theories one could assume that 
existence questions are settled, seems misguided: existence 
questions were supposedly settled because both sides accept 
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an ontology of properties; also, from a metaphysical 
perspective, both sides accept that properties should be 
understood as tropes. The question of the existence of 
tropes is not on the same level as the question on the 
existence of properties.  
This distinction impinges heavily on the relation between 
metaphysics and science on the one hand, and ontology and 
science, on the other. Certainly, this requires that the borders 
of each kind of investigation be reasonably made. But is this 
border possible to find? 
In order to address this worry, we should consider a 
dilemma apparently faced by the proposal that we have been 
building up to now.2 It seems that the methodological 
division of labor we have been proposing between ontology 
and metaphysics is, to say the least, unfeasible. On the one 
hand, the argument could go, the distinction between 
ontology and metaphysics cannot be assumed to be rigid, i.e., 
both disciplines cannot be thought of as being independently 
carried out. The reason for that claim is that metaphysics 
seems to be required for the proper advancement of an 
ontology: all the relevant identity conditions and application 
conditions for our terms are provided by the previous 
involvement of metaphysics. Metaphysics provides identity 
conditions or individuality conditions for the entities, 
according to the ‘no entity without identity’ slogan. So, the 
argument would go, how can metaphysics come after 
ontology? Metaphysics is required beforehand, it seems.  
This argument is quite interesting, but it relies on a 
confusion between two distinct senses of ‘identity’. As Lowe 
2015 has distinguished, ‘identity’ may mean at least two 
distinct things: the logical relation of numerical identity, or it may 
mean the individuality feature that confers to one entity its 
 
2 The objection is a courtesy of a referee, to whom we are grateful 
for pointing this to us. 
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individuality, being a property (in the sense that one could say 
that something ‘has identity’, meaning that it is an individual). 
Ontology may need that identity conditions or identity 
criteria are settled when ‘identity’ is understood in the first 
sense when one needs to count how many entities of a given 
kind are present and eventually distinguish them (and even 
this counting may be performed some times without the 
identity relation; see the discussion also in Lowe 2003). 
Counting and discussing how entities differ numerically is 
something that depends on the kind of terms that is being 
discussed, and need not be done through the metaphysical 
principle of individuality that confers each entity (if, at all) 
their individuality. It is enough that numerical difference is 
explained, in the sense of the logical identity. One can use 
properties, relations, spatial position, and many other 
features to account for numerical difference, but this does 
not mean that such things, properties, relations, spatial 
position, and others, are also being used to account for the 
metaphysical feature of individuality. This separation of tasks 
is important to be remarked because otherwise, counting 
would require a metaphysical principle of individuality in 
order to be effected; which is more than we can ask in most 
cases. What explains the individuality of something is most 
of the time not also that which accounts for the numerical 
difference in every situation. The question for identity, then, 
is ambiguous and may mean the mundane problem of 
numerical difference, or the more substantial, metaphysical 
question of individuality. The first need not be answered 
through metaphysics, the second requires metaphysics. 
One could still complain, however.3 It could be added to 
the previous objection that debates appearing specifically in 
publications typically classified as metaphysical, such as the 
 
3 As a referee did, in fact. We owe to him/her the follow up to the 
original objection. 
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debate on identity conditions for some specific kinds of 
entities K, are, in fact, metaphysical tasks that must be 
performed before ontology can be addressed. Consider the 
particular case of ‘person’. Typically, one could argue, 
traditional metaphysical debates in this case concern finding 
appropriate identity conditions (in the sense defined above) 
for persons, with the disputants offering two prominent 
choices, a psychological criterion, and a more bodily-
oriented criterion: 
(Psy) x and y are the same person iff x’s psychological 
make-up is appropriately psychologically related to y’s 
psychological make-up (where appropriate psychological 
properties include memory, intentions, and so on). 
(Bod) x and y are the same person iff x’s body is the same 
as y’s body. 
So, the objection could go, it is metaphysics’ task to 
determine such identity criteria, and that is done in order to 
grant discussions of ontological commitment with the 
required kind to get off the ground (still on the ‘no entity 
without identity’ plan). As a result, metaphysics would be 
required for ontology.  
But that is not a problem for our proposal. In fact, it 
concerns a sociological fact that discussions on ontology and 
metaphysics are typically made on the same kind of places, 
by the same kind of people. But that still does not prevent 
the more ‘subject-matter’ oriented distinction we are 
advancing here for methodological purposes. The fact that 
people working on the broad area of metaphysics do discuss 
identity criteria for some kinds does only mean that they are 
sometimes engaged in ontological debates too. In fact, the 
distinction we are advancing does not prevent one from 
seeing ontology as a subarea of metaphysics, as it is 
traditionally done (and as we do, see also the quote by 
Hofweber presented in the beginning). In this sense, one can 
say that people worried with identity criteria, in the sense 
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proposed, are doing metaphysics, but in the quite 
uninteresting sense that everyone doing ontology is doing 
metaphysics. That is not enough to blur the subject matter 
distinction we are proposing.  
Now, moving forward. Another evidence that such 
questions on identity criteria and individuality must be kept 
separated concerns disputes on non-individuality. One may 
have perfectly well-defined cardinality attributions (saying 
how many particles there are in a given context) while 
denying that individuality applies (see French and Krause 
2006, chap.7, Lowe 2015). Also, the separation allows us to 
make a better sense of those theories that somehow conflate, 
on purpose, the two issues. Indeed, typically, bundle theories 
use distinguishability (a criterion used to establish logical 
identity and difference) as a principle of individuality (the 
metaphysical feature), and the fact that the same kind of 
feature plays both roles is used as an argument for the 
simplicity of the view, leading to its being preferable over 
competitors (or so it is said). However, notice, even this 
debate can only get off the ground if the distinction we are 
suggesting between the two senses of identity is preserved. 
So, metaphysics is not really needed to get an ontology 
off the ground to begin with. But the argument against the 
distinction between ontology and metaphysics could also go 
from another route. It could be said that the boundary 
between metaphysics, ontology, and empirical science is 
fuzzy, and that then it seems hard to see in what sense we can 
read off our ontology from scientific theories without also 
reading a metaphysics, if it is admitted that such a scientific 
theory is itself informed by one’s metaphysics. This claim 
could acquire some momentum from historical cases where 
scientific theories were indeed based on metaphysical views 
(like Descartes’ physics, and Newton’s views on space and 
time, influenced by his theological assumptions). Our 
distinction would end up being a-historical, and this would 
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imply the failure in accounting for the fuzziness in the 
boundaries of metaphysics, ontology, and science. 
Concerning the a-historicity point, we are abstracting the 
psychology of scientific creation, that is, the motivations that 
scientists have for proposing scientific theories (which can 
be, and often are, metaphysical). Our point is that whatever 
metaphysics it is, it cannot benefit from physics from an 
epistemological point of view. Certainly, one can use 
whatever one has in hands to create a theory; however, the 
success of the empirical theory does not transfer to that 
whatever motivation that gave rise to the theory. This also 
holds for theory choice. One may argue that some 
interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics 
present a counter-example for this case inasmuch as 
metaphysical preferences come into play in the theoretical 
choices. Think about the poll presented by Schlosshauer (et 
al., 2013) in which working physicists expressed their 
preferences toward the interpretation of quantum mechanics 
and some interpretations were less popular than other ones 
particularly because of its relations with rather unpopular 
metaphysical views, such as the mind-body dualism in some 
versions of the Copenhaguen interpretation. A case in point 
of this preference is found in Lewis (2016, chap. 9) in which 
the so-called “Consciousness Causes Collapse” 
interpretation (due to mainly Wigner 1983, but see also de 
Barros and Oas 2017, and Bueno 2019) was ruled out of the 
space of possibilities for interpreting quantum phenomena 
because its relations with the mind-body problem. However, 
as we show in Arroyo and Arenhart (2019) show, this 
decision is not made on epistemic grounds but rather on a 
voluntarist basis. The epistemic warrant of a scientific theory 
does not bear on one’s metaphysical preferences. There may 
be pragmatical, psychological, heuristic, and a whole 
spectrum of criteria that can orient one’s preference in 
science, but this is not related to epistemic warrant. The same 
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can be said about determinism and indeterminism: 
depending on one’s metaphysical preference, one should 
prefer a deterministic theory, such as, say, Everettian 
quantum mechanics as opposed to other non-deterministic 
theorization of quantum phenomena. As far as we know, the 
decision process in the present state of art in the foundations 
of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is by large a 
voluntarist one (Dürr and Lazarovici 2020). So, in the same 
way, that science does not provide epistemic warrant to 
metaphysics, metaphysics does not provide privileged 
epistemic grounds for scientific theory choice.  
Regarding the fuzzy border between disciplines, this case 
may be inevitable, as Berto and Plebani (2015, p.4) have 
anticipated, often occurring in situations such as the 
following: “authors A and B can seriously disagree on the 
metaphysical status of entities of kind F, which they 
nevertheless agree to include in the ontological catalogue” 
— which indicates that ontological debates often flow into 
metaphysical debates. Perhaps this serves to illustrate the fact 
that, bracketing problems, strategies and discussions 
between the two disciplines, we are not necessarily imposing 
barriers between them. Apparently, there are problems 
specific to each discipline, but this should not necessarily 
imply that there are no relationships between them. The 
point we would like to emphasize is that the epistemology of 
ontology is more linked to science than metaphysics. But this 
certainly does not prevent the connection of the disciplines. 
It is worth noting that the distinction proposed here is 
not new, and has found fertile ground for debates in 
metaphilosophy even today. One of the examples that we 
can cite is Fine (2017, p.98), who distinguishes two ways of 
doing metaphysics: “one is with the nature of things, with 
what they are like; and the other is with reality, with what 
there is.” The first is called “naive” or “pre-critical” 
metaphysics. According to this view, “[...] even if we adopt a 
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negative ontological position on a certain class of objects, we 
can still sensibly pursue the question of what they are like” 
(p.100). As Fine (2017) presents it, the ‘naive metaphysics’ 
floats free even from ontology, not committing to the reality of the 
nature of the entities which are allowed to be investigated. 
The second task, on the other hand, would be linked to the 
description of how things are, in order to depend on an 
affirmative support (about what exists) of the ontology: 
 
So, from a methodological point of view, each 
of the two branches of metaphysics is capable 
of informing the other. However, there 
remains a sense in which ontology is prior. For 
once we have established a negative answer to 
the ontological question, we cannot sensibly 
raise the question of what the objects of the 
given class are like. Metaphysics proper will, in 
this sense, presuppose a positive answer to the 
ontological question. (Fine 2017, p.99) 
 
Again, the distinction proposed here is not made from 
scratch; it has been done over the past few years by other 
authors. The novelty of our proposal is that we are showing 
the fruitfulness of the distinction for science metaphysics, a 
sub-discipline of metaphysics in a broad sense. Thus, it is 
important to distance ourselves also from Fine for our 
purposes of the subarea: metaphysics of science. That is, the 
relationship with science is not peripheral, it is central to this 
paper. Therefore, even if, widely considered, metaphysics 
can in fact be conducted with a disciplinary independence in 
relation to ontology, to physics, or anything else, it is worth 
mentioning that the metaphysics of science is necessarily 
constrained to the ontology that comes, from somehow, of 
science — even though, as we have seen, it is a very small 
part of ontology. 
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4. Ontology, metaphysics, science 
 
The idea that the debate between Quine and Carnap on 
ontology somehow revived classical metaphysics, with 
Carnap’s attempt to debunk metaphysics being defeated by 
Quine, is part of the analytic metaphysics folklore. Quine is 
seen as having provided not only for a revival of the 
discipline, but also for new methods for metaphysics; what is 
meant by that is the idea that the criterion of ontological 
commitment has shed light on how metaphysical questions 
could be profitably pursued. Of course, that emphasizes the 
role of quantifiers, and leads one to think of metaphysics as 
being concerned with existence questions. Also, that view 
leads to the recent revolt against the centrality of existence 
questions by part of the “grounding community” (see 
Schaffer 2009, Koslicki 2016). As we hope to have made 
clear in the previous section, prima facie there is room for 
everyone, provided that the proper distinctions are kept in 
mind. This has not been done so frequently. 
For one case, consider Loux and Zimmerman (2003, p.2), 
who claim that due to Quine’s approach to ontology, 
“philosophers no longer felt the need to conceal their 
interest in metaphysical issues, and there was something like 
a revival of traditional metaphysics”. The diagnosis seems 
perfectly correct because traditional topics in metaphysics 
were indeed revived; however, the crucial question is whether 
such a revival was justified by Quinean lights. Thomasson 
(2016, p.122) puts the issue in similar terms when claiming 
that historically, it was thought that Carnap’s approach to 
ontology was dead because Carnap’s deflationism “was 
thought to have been defeated by Quine as he inaugurated a 
renaissance for serious metaphysics”. Although Thomasson 
thinks that Quine failed in his criticism of Carnap, Quine is 
seen as opening the door for serious metaphysics. 
This is not the place for a reconstruction of the Quine-
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Carnap debate (see Alspector-Kelly 2001 for a reassessment 
of the debate and its results). However, there are some 
lessons from this debate that may enlighten precisely why, as 
Koslicki has put it, their views may generate skepticism 
about metaphysics, but not about ontology, as in the sense 
that we propose in this paper. Also, it may shed some light 
on the methods of ontology and its relation to science (a 
topic that has concerned metaphysicians for some time 
now). This brief digression will substantiate our claim that a 
distinction between ontology and metaphysics, as defended 
here, in particular, may benefit the methodological 
discussions of those areas. 
It is well known that Carnap advanced his latest approach 
to ontology in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” 
(1956). We shall not revise in detail Carnap’s position here, 
which is well-known, but for the sake of having some points 
clear, we present the approach in a nutshell. Carnap suggests 
that to accept a new kind of entity, one must provide for a 
linguistic framework appropriate for that kind of entity. The 
framework must contain terms for referring to that kind of 
entity, rules of formation, and also rules for the adequate use 
of the language. Basically, that means that a framework must 
embody some kind of rules for the verification of its well-
formed sentences. Systems are of a logical type if the rules 
indicate logical verification (deductions), and are of a factual 
type if those rules are empirical (verification by experience). 
The first kind of questions and answers are analytic, the 
second, synthetic. Inside the language framework, existence 
questions are formulated and answered using the resources 
of the system; these are the internal questions. 
Examples of a framework of empirical kind concern the 
framework of things, such as rocks, kings, horses, sheets of 
paper, and so on. Inside a framework like this, one may 
formulate questions such as “do unicorns exist?” and “is 
there a sheet of paper over my table?”, and verify empirically 
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the answer to such questions; the answers are provided by 
experience. A logical framework may concern, for instance, 
the language of the arithmetic for natural numbers, which 
besides the terms for such entities, contains the rules of 
deduction to deal with those entities. Questions such as “are 
there numbers?”, or “are there infinite twin prime 
numbers?” are formulated and answered inside this 
framework by logical means, so that the answers are all 
analytic. 
Besides internal questions, there is also a second kind of 
question, the so-called external questions. These are questions 
about the admissibility of a framework. They are practical 
questions, concerning whether it is useful, for the purposes of 
science, to adopt a given language. So, one should not ask 
whether the number language corresponds to reality, or 
whether its adoption is justified in virtue of numbers really 
existing, but rather ask whether it is useful for scientific 
purposes to adopt such a language. Typical ontological 
questions raised by philosophers were thought to involve the 
justification of the admissibility of a language. Thus, the 
dispute between Platonists and nominalists in mathematics 
is seen as involving the justification of adopting a language 
quantifying over numbers, sets, and so on. Carnap does not 
think this will take us very far, because there is no way to 
decide the issue. It is rather a practical issue of the 
admissibility of a language, not a matter of truth or 
falsehood. This way of framing the point was considered as 
a deflation of the ontological problem, given that internal 
questions already assume the adoption of the language 
(hence, they are not the traditional philosophical question), 
while external questions are not theoretical, but rather 
practical. However, instead of a deflation of ontological 
questions, one could perhaps better consider it as a 
transformation of a philosophical problem, from a theoretical 
question into a practical issue. As Creath (2016, p.198) puts 
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it: 
 
It would be more accurate to say that Carnap 
wants to transform the discussion of 
philosophical ontology rather than to dismiss 
it. He wants to transform it from a theoretical 
dispute that has not gotten very far in a very 
long time (except for changes in fashion) into a 
practical issue over what tool to adopt. On 
Carnap’s transformative approach we can 
productively investigate the practical 
consequences of using this or that tool and get 
on with the business of science without trying 
to find the one correct metaphysical position to 
adopt. 
 
So, there is no issue of finding a correct metaphysical 
position to adopt, but rather the issue of whether adopting a 
given language is expedient for scientific purposes. There is 
not a question of the adequacy of a given language, only of 
its expediency. Of course, in the original Carnapian 
approach, a language must contain some rules of verification 
in order to cooperate with the verification theory of 
meaning, but what is relevant is that the external question, 
which is not theoretic, is judged by its expediency to deal 
with science.  
This proposal by Carnap has close ties to the Quinean 
view on ontology. In his criticism of the Carnapian 
approach, Quine has advanced a few criticisms of the 
division between internal and external questions as related to 
the distinction between analytic and the synthetic. As it is 
now well studied (see again Alspector-Kelly 2001 for a clear 
exposition of the case), Quine seems to have misunderstood 
the doctrines of ESO, thinking that Carnap wanted 
somehow to safeguard ontological questions, just as logical 
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and mathematical questions, as being analytic (without 
empirical content). He makes the issue of his disagreement 
with Carnap very clear in his (1966, p.134):  
 
Within natural science there is a continuum of 
gradations, from the statements which report 
observations to those which reflect basic 
features say of quantum theory or of theory of 
relativity. […] statements of ontology or even 
of mathematics and logic form a continuation 
of this continuum, a continuation which is 
perhaps yet more remote from observation 
than are the central principles of quantum 
theory or relativity. The differences here are in 
my view differences only of degree and not in 
kind. Science is a unified structure, and in 
principle it is the structure as a whole, and not 
its component statements on by on, that 
experience confirms or shows to be imperfect. 
Carnap maintains that ontological questions, 
and likewise questions of logical and 
mathematical principle, are questions not of 
fact but of choosing a convenient conceptual 
scheme or framework for science; and with this 
I agree only if the same be conceded for every 
scientific hypothesis.  
 
That is, Quine took it that empirical hypotheses, on Carnap’s 
view, were directly testable, while logic, ontology, and 
mathematics, involved issues related to the choice of a 
language. Questions in these fields — Quine thought — had 
analytic answers, by their own definition. Obviously, this is 
not the approach of Carnap in ESO, which sees logic and 
mathematical systems as on a par with empirical systems, 
although with distinct methods of verification. The point, for 
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Carnap, as we have seen also with the quotation of Creath 
above, concerns the appropriate choice of a language for 
science, independently of whether that language deals with 
empirical or abstract entities.  
Quine joins Carnap in treating ontological questions as a 
matter of the choice of a language. That is clear from his 
quotation above. However, the difference is that, while 
Carnap thought it possible to safeguard some 
epistemological privilege for science (empirical or logical) 
through the adoption of verification rules, Quine saw no 
reason to do that (due to his criticism of the analytic-
synthetic separation). Science and ontology are in the same 
pragmatic boat, and the empirical hypotheses of science are 
also chosen in such a pragmatic fashion. They are not 
justified because of some direct verification, but due to their 
success in the system of science. The disagreement between 
Carnap and Quine, then, lies not on what concerns the proper 
understanding of ontology, but rather on what concerns the epistemology 
of science. Unlike Carnap, who conceived science as a subject 
matter satisfying the principle of verification, and hence, 
with epistemic privileges, Quine conceived of science as also 
indirectly related to experience, with hypotheses closer or 
farther from experience, depending on their place in the 
belief network. Just as the hypotheses of quantum mechanics 
help us to organize and predict future experience, so does 
ontology. We posit the existence of certain entities in our 
theories in order to systematize experience. That is how 
material bodies were introduced a long time ago in the course 
of human evolution, molecules, and more recently, curved 
spacetime and wave-like particles of quantum mechanics.   
Basically, then, ontology, for both Quine and Carnap, is 
a matter of choosing a conceptual scheme for 
accommodating science. Notice that this involves accepting 
certain classes of entities as useful for science, and discarding 
others as not so useful. An ontology is justified in the 
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measure of its success in systematizing science (Quine is 
known for adopting physicalism with classes, while Carnap 
was more open-minded on different conceptual schemes for 
accommodating science).  
Given that brief summary, and that there is a pragmatic-
naturalistic background common to Quine and Carnap, their 
approach to ontology suggests a method for ontology: if the 
items to which we will confer existence are those posited by 
our best scientific theories and those required to 
accommodate our best scientific theories, then one could try 
to extract ontological commitments from such theories. 
While those theories seem to come with an associated 
ontology, some issues remain to be discussed, as for instance, 
the precise delimitation of the ontology, the ontological 
commitments of the mathematics associated with the theory, 
and so on. However, what is relevant here is that there is a 
method for discussing these problems: the careful study of 
whether some of these postulated entities are necessary for 
the functioning of the corresponding scientific theory. 
Furthermore, constraints are imposed on such investigation 
just as they are imposed in the formulation of scientific 
theories: economy, fruitfulness, empirical adequacy, and 
other virtues expected from scientific theories are also to be 
employed to judge the appropriateness of ontology, given 
that they are part of the same naturalistic enterprise.   
To bring the issue of naturalism even closer to ontology, 
current discussions in quantum mechanics may shed some 
light in the issue of choice of ontology. In fact, given that 
distinct interpretations of quantum mechanics populate the 
world with distinct entities and processes, choosing an 
interpretation is also, in part, choosing an ontology. As 
Ruetsche (2015, p.343) has argued, someone who believes 
realistically in quantum mechanics believes in an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is roughly a 
description of how the world looks like according to 
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quantum mechanics. That is why choosing an interpretation 
is, in part, choosing an ontology. Interpretations, in their 
turn, do end up having an impact on the practice of quantum 
mechanics, given that some of them even change the 
formalism of the theory. So, just as there are difficulties in 
currently settling an interpretation as the best, there are 
difficulties in settling an ontology as the most appropriate. 
But what is relevant is that the problem of choice of ontology 
is on the same footing as a scientific problem of setting an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is not an external 
problem coming from outside of the scientific domain (that 
the problem of interpreting a theory is a scientific problem, 
see Sklar 2010). The fact that one cannot currently choose 
one interpretation over other rivals (and consequently, one 
ontology over its rivals) generates a well-known problem in 
the philosophy of science, the underdetermination of theory by 
evidence. But that is just a problem for those in the business 
of discovering which is the best account of reality.  
At this point, perhaps the best strategy is to avoid 
focusing so much on issues of appropriate formalization, 
and focus more roughly on the more general lessons of a 
scientific theory for the ontology, even if this can only be 
considered as a preliminary step, to be further refined in 
latter stages. This would still be according to the general lines 
suggested by a broadly Quinean metaontology (and, for our 
purposes, this is illustrative; one could certainly also follow 
other approaches to ontology, for instance, in Meinongian 
lines, and attempt to check what are the existing entities a 
theory is positing too). For the purposes of this discussion, 
just remember that Quine (1966, p.125) would simply like to 
investigate, with the ontological commitment method, “[...] 
what, according to that theory, there is”. In this sense, we are 
providing for the first steps to address the ontological 
problem. This is where we can call exemplification with 
quantum mechanics to gain clarity in the debate. For many 
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authors in recent literature, providing a physical theory is 
providing an ontology and dynamics for the theory. We 
bring two examples of this. Esfeld (2019, p.222) states that a 
physical theory needs to: 
 
(i) spell out an ontology of what there is in 
nature according to the theory, (ii) provide a 
dynamics for the elements of the ontology and 
(iii) deduce measurement outcome statistics 
from the ontology and dynamics by treating 
measurement interactions within the ontology 
and dynamics; in order to do so, the ontology 
and dynamics have to be linked with an 
appropriate probability measure. Thus, the 
question is: What is the law that describes the 
individual processes that occur in nature 
(dynamics) and what are the entities that make 
up these individual processes (ontology)? 
 
In the same vein, Maudlin (2019, p.4, original emphasis) 
states that: 
 
A physical theory should contain a physical 
ontology: What the theory postulates to exist as 
physically real. And it should also contain 
dynamics: laws (either deterministic or 
probabilistic) describing how these physically 
real entities behave. In a precise physical 
theory, both the ontology and the dynamics are 
represented in sharp mathematical terms. 
 
In the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, what 
determines a quantum theory is the accepted solution to the 
measurement problem, e.g., the trilemma, due to Maudlin 
(1995), that emerges when it is conjointly assumed that i) the 
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quantum description is complete, i.e. that nothing else 
describes the physical properties of the system of interest; ii) 
it admits only a linear dynamics, i.e., a dynamics that admits 
that a sum of results is a result; iii) provides unique 
measurement results, e.g., does not admit that a sum is a 
result. At least one of these items needs to be negated, and 
the negation of each of them results in a quantum theory 
with its own dynamics and ontologies. For example, denying 
the first results in a dynamic with hidden variables and an 
ontology of point particles (see Bohm and Hiley 2006); the 
negative of the second gives rise to a quantum theory with 
dynamics with collapse, and the ontology can vary from mass 
density to flashes (see Allori 2021); denying the third item, 
finally, results in a quantum theory with linear dynamics, 
some which postulate only the reality of the wave function 
(see Albert 2013), and others postulate the existence of 
multiverses (see Wallace 2012) but the point is that whatever 
the ontology, it is associated with a precise dynamic law and, 
therefore, linked to physics in some way. While we are not 
arguing for a full-blown defense of such a naturalistic 
method for ontology here, what we claim is that it should be 
clear that naturalism provides a way to keep the investigation 
of ontology closely tied to science, and also that there is a 
sign of a clearly delimited approach. Notice: in the specific 
case we are discussing here, ontology and entity postulation 
in science are on a par; the posits do play a role in the 
dynamics of physics, and even if we cannot decide which 
interpretation of quantum mechanics to choose merely on 
physical grounds, the problem is still a problem to be decided 
by physics.  
Furthermore, and even more relevant for our purposes here, 
is the fact that this kind of approach does not transfer itself 
immediately to metaphysics. Notice that it is not fruitful for 
science to discuss whether the fields in physics are tropes or 
universals. This distinction (between tropes and universals) 
 Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Raoni W. Arroyo 38 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
plays no role in the physical theory, neither in the dynamics, 
nor anywhere else. The same could be said of the notion of 
individuals and non-individuals in quantum mechanics. 
While some of the founders of quantum mechanics 
considered it appropriate — and even necessary — to 
discuss the metaphysical status of particles in quantum 
mechanics, they did so in popular science books in an 
attempt to convey the consequences of quantum theory to 
the general public, rather than just presenting it in their 
academic treatises and theoretical articles (see also French 
and Krause 2006, chap.3). This, we suspect, happens because 
these notions have no role to play in the theoretical 
development of physics. If they had a place in physics, they 
would be physics, not metaphysics!  
Nota bene: this is not intended to mean that particular 
scientists may not have used some specific metaphysical 
conviction to address some scientific problem (see also our 
previous discussion concerning the menace of a-historicity 
of our proposal). Schrödinger (1998), to restrict ourselves to 
a telling case, seems to have suggested that quantum statistics 
and quantum non-individuality are closely associated, with 
quantum mechanics somehow requiring non-individuality if 
the new statistics (Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac) are to 
make sense. However, as the latter analyses showed, this is 
not justified (see French and Krause 2006, chap.4); 
metaphysics does not play such a heavy role in physics, 
although it may be part of the heuristics and may guide the 
psychology of discovery in some cases. Our major point here 
is that such associated metaphysical pictures do not derive 
any epistemic privilege from this association with science. 
Basically, one can provide for the scientific explanation 
without using the metaphysical picture, and this is typically 
done (how could instrumentalists about quantum mechanics 
make sense of the theory in purely instrumental terms, if 
such heavy metaphysics were already involved in the most 
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basic steps?).   
As a result, naturalism has a (modest) place in ontology, 
it seems, but it is much harder to make sense of its role in 
metaphysics. In fact, seen as a question of fundamentality or 
metaphysical profile, metaphysics will most certainly be 
independent of science (see also Benovsky 2016 for a 
defense of this claim). The search for the most fundamental 
concepts may be understood as a search in physics, in the 
terms of the theory of everything, or as a fundamentality 
search, in the terms of metaphysics. In the first case, there 
will be an answer for the ontological question (what is there? 
Strings, fields, information, mathematical entities), but still 
not for the metaphysical question. In the second case, there 
will be an answer to the metaphysical question, but not for 
the ontological (physical) question. Metaphysics cannot 
directly benefit from the success of science in this case. 
Understood in terms of what we have called a ‘pure 
metaphysics’ in the previous section, metaphysics is an 
independent area of research. 
Being detached from scientific practice, the answer to 
metaphysical questions will originate another kind of 
underdetermination, called the underdetermination of metaphysics 
by science (see also French 2014, chap.3). In fact, typical pure 
metaphysical theories are immune to science, because they 
just provide for answers to metaphysical questions that must 
be compatible with science (when applied to science), but 
cannot be derived from it. The metaphysical 
underdetermination, unlike the underdetermination of 
interpretation and ontology, cannot be expected to be 
resolved by further advances in science. In fact, given its level 
of abstraction, metaphysics must be floating free from 
science on a more general level.  
An exception to this kind of metaphysical detachment 
from science concerns the more negative claims that some 
metaphysical theories may be incompatible with scientific 
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theories (Arenhart 2012; Arroyo and Arenhart 2019). Some 
metaphysical theories may be plugged into some scientific 
theories and provide for accounts incompatible with 
scientific theories. A straightforward example concerns 
simple versions of bundle theory and quantum mechanics; 
according to a standard view, quantum entities cannot be 
seen as bundles of properties, given that they violate basic 
tenets of the view, such as the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles (the PII, see French and Krause 2006, chap.4). 
Anyway, this negative approach does not allow us to endow 
metaphysical theories with positive evidence deriving from 
science, but only with negative evidence that a metaphysical 
theory fails in the attempts of applying certain metaphysical 
concepts to certain scientific theories. In other words: when 
applying a metaphysical theory to the ontology of science, 
one may have negative feedback due to incompatibility, but 
that is not enough to have any positive evidence for a 
metaphysical theory, and does not deal directly with the 
epistemology of pure metaphysics. 
There are two distinct options that seem available once it 
is recognized that metaphysics may not enjoy any kind of 
epistemic privilege from science (be it pure or applied 
metaphysics). On the one hand, it is possible to follow the lead 
of Carnap and Quine and be anti-realist in metaontology, 
while being somehow realist about the ontology adopted 
(adoption of theory is a pragmatic matter, but from an 
internal perspective, the posited entities exist objectively). 
This is typically conjoined with skepticism about 
metaphysics, understood as the claim that one must go one 
step further and address deeper questions (i.e. Chakravartty’s 
Challenge, or something to that effect). According to this 
approach, metaphysics goes just too far in asking for 
questions that are out of the epistemic reach of science, 
which, on the naturalist’s eyes, constitute our best 
epistemology. On the other hand, it is possible to avoid 
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metaphysical skepticism and think that the fundamental 
items are objective, they are a metaphysical dressing that 
should be compatible with whatever posits ontology may 
happen to advance. So, the view is compatible with distinct 
combinations of realism in metaontology and 
metaphilosophy. Obviously, the kind of views of 
metaphysics and ontology that fit with each option is 
different. This is a virtue of the distinction we have 
advanced, e.g. such second-order options are enlightened.  
In case one is willing to embrace metaphysics as 
independent from science and having its own epistemology, 
then one will have to address the typical kind of issues that 
the current metametaphysics literature has already raised 
concerning the objectivity of metaphysical claims (and, quite 
importantly, the attacks following the manifesto by Ladyman 
and Ross 2007). To many philosophers, a close relationship 
with science would provide some relief in dealing with the 
endless uncertainties of metaphysics, endowing metaphysics 
with some epistemic justification from science (obviously, 
that kind of justification has not been achieved yet). Once 
metaphysics floats free from science, there is no hope for 
such direct relation, but perhaps that is just what 
metaphysicians (pure and applied) were expecting. We shall 





What a proper distinction between the tasks of ontology 
and metaphysics opens up for us, then, is a clear scenario in 
which distinct sets of discussions may be conducted, with 
their own methods, problems, and each own with its 
resulting epistemology attached, which may be more or less 
connected to science. As we have argued, when ontology is 
restricted to problems of existence, problems of the first 
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order and of the higher-order are subject to clearer 
examination. Perspectives for naturalizing ontology seem 
good, given that a pragmatic approach is adopted, following 
the lead of Carnap and Quine.  
Also, it becomes clear that metaphysics deals with more 
general questions, which cannot benefit from a direct contact 
with science. In fact, differently from what happens in 
ontology, one cannot hope that fundamental entities (say 
tropes or universals, individuals or non-individuals) could 
intervene in scientific theorizing, or be part of it in a direct 
sense, as wave functions, quantum fields, or inertial forces, 
are. Things are different in ontology. The case of the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics makes the issue really 
clear. Consider many-worlds interpretations. They populate 
reality with worlds, so that our catalog of reality gets new 
entries with new worlds every time a measurement is made. 
Worlds, the posits of the interpretation, play a role in the 
economy of science. They are involved in theory choice and 
in theory development: the former happens because they 
allow a collapse-free formulation of quantum mechanics, 
therefore allowing retrodiction — and this could be 
considered an advantage over formulations of rivals which 
are not retroditional; the latter happens because it may be 
easy to provide for extensions to quantum field theory, easier 
than other interpretations such as Bohm’s, and also provide 
for further scientific problems (e.g. accounting for probability 
in the many-worlds interpretation). However, no 
metaphysical profile of what worlds are (in metaphysical 
terms) does any such thing; the metaphysical dressing of 
worlds (if any such is available) does not impact on such 
problems. Then, metaphysical profiles are not directly 
involved in such theoretical constructs within science. 
The door opens up then for two distinct attitudes: 
skepticism about metaphysics on the one hand, or adoption 
of metaphysics as an independent branch, with its own goals 
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and methods, on the other. The current wave of 
naturalization of metaphysics is the result of the claim by 
philosophers who think that metaphysics by itself does not 
seem to have contributed to the objective knowledge of 
reality as science did (as defended by Ladyman and Ross 
2007). The diagnosis was that metaphysics was simply way 
too far from the objective structure of reality, and should be 
closer to science, contributing to it, if it is to play any such 
role. However, the confusion between ontology and 
metaphysics has prevented real progress on this front. We 
hope our discussion has made it clear why such a relationship 
is a quite complex one. 
Finally, for those willing to pursue metaphysical 
problems independently from science, the distinction 
provided here also brings some lessons. For example, instead 
of focusing on why the questions of existence are not the 
right kind of problem and underestimate the importance of 
this discussion, the focus should be on metaphysical 
questions and their epistemology. Once the problems 
addressed by metaphysics are clearly distinguished, the battle 
between the questions of existence on the one hand, and the 
questions of fundamentality and of the investigation of 
relations such as grounding and dependence on the other, is 
seen as ill-motivated.  
Given all of this, maybe this is the place to address one 
further worry, and leave the paper with a promissory note. 
After all the discussion we have presented, it could be further 
objected that our separation of existence questions on one 
side (ontological), and fundamentality and grounding issues, 
on the other (metaphysics), puts some pressure on ourselves 
when it comes to a faithful account of important current 
debates; basically, the distinction fails to preserve the nature 
of important debates in metaphysics/ontology, which violate 
our separation of the fields. The fact is, it could be claimed, 
that some actual debates about existence concern whether we 
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should quantify over fundamental entities only, or, over 
fundamental and non-fundamental entities as well (the 
Cameron/Fine debate in the literature). This requires that we 
apply the distinction between ‘fundamental’ and ‘non-
fundamental’ to our inventory of reality, contrarily to the 
division of subject matter we are suggesting here. What then? 
First off, as we already said, we do not think that the 
bracketing of the two disciplines by their respective tasks 
necessarily comes with a rigid barrier between them. Our 
main point here was to emphasize that the epistemology of 
ontological tasks is more linked to science than that of 
metaphysical tasks, and how methodological debates in the 
philosophy of science may benefit from that bracketing. 
Nevertheless, we believe that there is much to be discussed 
on this topic, due to ambiguities on the concepts employed, 
so that a full answer is simply not possible here. Space 
prevents us from a full treatment of the topic, but let us 
briefly deal with it. On the one hand, the 
fundamental/grounded dichotomy is in fact applied to 
ontology in the current use of the terminology. For instance, 
one finds claims to the effect that sets are fundamental, and 
numbers, say, are grounded on sets. Or, considering debates 
on ontic structural realism (see French 2014), we find claims that 
relations are fundamental, and objects are grounded in them. 
On the other hand, one could, following the illustration of 
Koslicki quoted in section 3 of this paper, apply the 
dichotomy in focus to what we are calling ‘metaphysics’. In 
this latter sense, one can argue, for instance, that tropes are 
fundamental, while objects are grounded in them, or, 
alternatively, one could argue that both tropes and objects 
are fundamental. We have reserved the 
grounding/fundamental divide to metaphysics, and its 
application to metaphysical notions, as suggested, for 
instance, by Koslicki (not intended, it seems), and by 
Benovsky (2016) (intentionally, it seems). So, we have got at 
   Back to the question of ontology (and metaphysics) 45 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
least half of it right. Did we get the other half wrong, when 
we prevented the dichotomy from applying to ontology?  
Our proposal does in fact place the divide in terms at 
odds with what we find in current disputes, but we believe 
this is the right thing to do. When we allow the distinction 
to apply to the metaphysical debate, we capture such 
discussions as Koslicki and Benovsky already develop, 
allowing for a metaphysical kind of investigation that is 
independent of science. When we prevent that such a divide 
transpires to ontology, we are not abolishing the discussion 
on the scope of quantifiers, as it appears in the 
Cameron/Fine debate. Rather, we propose that this is not 
the same kind of dispute as it appears in metaphysics, as 
dealing with metaphysical concepts. If ontologists are to 
determine what is fundamental and what is grounded, as the 
current debate suggests, with the division applying to the 
problem of advancing catalog of reality, and as required by 
the current use of the terms, we end up in a situation where 
ontology and science are on the same business of finding the 
ultimate elements of reality (see also Bennett 2016), 
disputing on the same field. Worse yet: ontology would be 
claiming for itself the job of explaining (through a quite 
mysterious relation) how the furniture of the world is 
structured from fundamental to non-fundamental, from 
particles to tables composed of particles (or whatever one 
could take as fundamental in the required sense). This, again, 
would be an attempt to provide for an alternative to the 
already on-going scientific project of providing for such 
explanations, and ontology would, once more, be a rival to 
science. By restricting the mentioned divide to metaphysics, 
we allow it a subject matter not competing with science 
(since it needs not to find the ultimate posits of reality, but 
the dressing for the posits of science, and how such dressing 
structure themselves through grounding and dependence 
relations). When it comes to ontology, then, it would be 
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better to use a different terminology for the related questions 
of when some entities are posited by a theory, and when they 
can be part of the furniture advanced by the theory, but still, 
be defined/reduced/explicated in terms of posits that are 
already available. This is clearly an issue in ontology of 
science, and depends on the workings of the scientific theory 
being dealt with, and on how one is going to understand 
ontological commitment. However the finer details are 
pursued, we believe, we can separate it from the issue of 
grounding/fundamentality, in order to avoid having to put 
ontology as an adversary to science. The debate on ontology, 
on whether to quantify over the fundamental entities, or over 
fundamental and everything else, may be converted on a 
debate on whether to quantify over the entities of the 
ultimate physical theory only, or on the entities of science 
more broadly, and, of course, on whether some kind of 
theoretical reduction exists for non-fundamental (now in the 
scientific sense) theories to fundamental theories (probably 
theories of physics). That is, the issue of quantifying over 
strings only, say, or quantifying over strings and tables and 
parrots, depends on what one takes to be the relations 
between fundamental physical theories and non-
fundamental theories, and whether one takes science to be 
unified at all. These are delicate issues, and we can only point 
to them here. Recall: we are quite aware that this is not how 
terminology is in fact used in the debate, but we propose that 
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